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February 2003 
Honorable Court: 
Attorneys Rebecca Smith of the National Employment Law Project, 
Professor Sarah Cleveland, Amanda Levinson and Emily Rickers of the 
University of Texas School of Law, Professor Beth Lyon of Villanova 
University School of Law,1 Ana Avendaño of the National Immigration 
Law Center and D. Michael Dale of the Northwest Worker Justice Center 
present this brief amicus curiae on behalf of fifty labor, civil rights and 
immigrants’ rights organizations in the United States, listed in Appendix A, 
in the matter of the Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the 
Government of the United Mexican States to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights regarding the human rights of migrant workers, OC-18. 
INTRODUCTION 
Immigrant workers in the United States of America are among the most 
poorly paid and poorly treated in the workforce.  Amici’s attempts to protect 
the rights of immigrants, including unauthorized2 workers, have been 
severely hampered by domestic U.S. laws that discriminate on the basis of 
alienage and immigration status, and especially by a recent decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).   
Immigrant workers in particular employment-related visa categories are 
explicitly excluded from the protections of certain U.S. labor and 
employment laws. So, too, immigrant workers who lack employment 
authorization required by federal law (“unauthorized immigrants”) are 
denied the protection of some state and federal laws.  As a result of the 
Hoffman decision, many employers have defended pending cases by 
claiming that unauthorized immigrant workers have no labor and 
employment rights in the United States.  Undoubtedly, some lower courts 
will find that unauthorized immigrants are excluded from the protections of 
additional labor laws.  
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In the U.S., employer threats to retaliate against complaining workers by 
calling in the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to arrest them 
are common.  These threats are on the rise in the last several months, and 
have had several pernicious effects:  First, they have a severe chilling effect 
on workers’ ability to enforce their remaining rights.  Second, employers 
who would first hire, then abuse, and finally retaliate against unauthorized 
employees gain a competitive advantage over those who follow the law.   
Since these employers suffer no penalty for violating the law, they are 
encouraged to hire the undocumented, and the goals of U.S. immigration 
laws are thus thwarted. 
Amici are concerned that continued employer threats of retaliation and 
actual retaliation mean that, regardless of the outcome of pending legal 
cases, many immigrant workers will be too intimidated to bring their 
legitimate complaints to the authorities.  Because of this chilling effect, and 
because of legal restrictions on access to federal legal services for 
undocumented immigrants, the result will be more severe exploitation of a 
highly vulnerable workforce, all to the detriment of workers, law-abiding 
employers, and domestic immigration policy. 
The OAS Charter proclaims that “work gives dignity to the one who 
performs it.”3  Discriminatory U.S. laws deprive millions of migrant 
workers of that dignity simply because they have been forced to cross 
international borders in order to survive.  In the name of immigration 
control, U.S. federal and state employment laws violate international human 
rights law binding on this country.  
Amici recognize that states retain the authority under international law to 
decide whether to admit aliens.  For the purposes of this case, amici do not 
dispute that a state may have the right to deny employment to aliens 
altogether under certain circumstances, in order to further its border control 
policy.  However, once an alien is present in a state’s territory and actually 
working, international law, including the instruments of the OAS system, 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of alienage or immigration status in 
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workplace benefits and protects the right to freedom of association for all 
workers.  U.S. employment laws that discriminate against migrant workers 
on the basis of alienage or immigration classification accordingly violate 
these norms. 
This amicus submission considers only those human rights sources that 
are binding in some form on the United States.  Amici curiae understand 
that this Court has no jurisdiction over the United States and do not make 
the following argument in order to seek any binding legal pronouncements 
on our government’s actions.  We feel it is important, however, to 
demonstrate that the United States’ practice subjects the massive migrant 
worker population in this country to human rights deprivations of the most 
serious kind. We hope thus to demonstrate to this Honorable Court the 
urgent necessity for strong regional standards regarding the protection of 
migrant workers.  
The importance of this question for millions of OAS nationals who 
migrate for employment, and the lack of jurisprudence from other 
international bodies regarding the employment rights of migrant workers, 
create an important opportunity for this Court to clarify the obligations of 
the Inter-American system and to provide fundamental human rights 
protection to this uniquely vulnerable group.  
ARGUMENT 
I. U.S. Laws Deny Basic Employment Protections to Foreign Workers on 
the Basis of Alienage or Immigration Status. 
A. The Unauthorized Population Performs a Large Part of the Low-
Wage, High Risk Employment in the United States.  
North America absorbs the highest number of international migrants in 
the world.4 The United States is the top migrant-receiving nation, and has 
the largest international migrant population worldwide.5 A subgroup of the 
migrant population is undocumented. The number of undocumented 
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immigrants in the United States is estimated at roughly double the entire 
undocumented population of Europe.6  In some industries, these numbers 
are extremely high.  For example, eighty-one percent of U.S. farm workers 
are foreign-born, mainly from Mexico.7  At least half of the agricultural 
workforce is not authorized to work in the United States.8  
Various sources provide estimates of the undocumented population in the 
U.S.  The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) keeps a 
periodically updated estimate of undocumented residents.  The latest INS 
statistic estimates five million undocumented immigrants as of 1996.9  More 
recent private estimates profit from the 2000 Census process, which 
invested resources in encouraging greater participation by undocumented 
immigrants.10 The Pew Hispanic Center, a non-partisan research 
organization,11 estimates the total illegal-resident population in the United 
States at 7.8 million.12  The Migration Policy Institute tentatively places the 
2000 undocumented population at 8.5 million.13  
The Pew Hispanic Center estimates the numbers of undocumented 
immigrants in the workforce, placing the unauthorized urban labor force at 
5.3 million14 and the unauthorized agricultural labor force at 1.2 million.15  
The Center notes that there is significant overlap between the urban and 
agricultural work force and because of the uncertainty about how to 
calculate the overlap, the authors decline to provide an estimate of the total 
unauthorized workforce.16  For the purposes of this brief, using the urban 
labor force figure of 5.3 million as a rough estimate of the total number of 
undocumented workers in the United States is sufficient to establish the 
population as a serious economic factor and compelling focus of political 
and human concern.  
About 4.7 million of the U.S. undocumented population, or 55%, come 
from Mexico.  About 1.9 million come from other nations in Latin America, 
and 1.1 million come from Asia.  A few hundred thousand undocumented 
immigrants come from Europe, Canada, and Africa.17 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae Brief  805 
VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003 
Undocumented workers in the United States work in a variety of low 
wage, high-risk occupations.  The manufacturing sector employs 1.2 million 
undocumented workers.  The services sector employs 1.3 million 
undocumented workers.  One million to 1.4 million unauthorized workers 
labor in the fields.  Six hundred thousand more work in construction and 
700,000 work in restaurants.18   
In 1996 and 1997, INS inspections found that 23% of workers at 
Nebraska and Iowa meatpacking plants had questionable documents.  An 
INS inspection of eighty-nine construction businesses in Las Vegas found 
that 39% of workers appeared to be unauthorized to work.  Inspections of 
seventy-four Los Angeles-area garment contractors found 41% of the 
employees were unauthorized to work.19  In recent years, the number of 
unauthorized immigrant workers in the poultry industry has increased, 
prompting the INS to deem the employment of unauthorized workers a 
major problem.20   
Many of these same industries are known for low wages, dangerous 
conditions, and frequent violations of labor laws.  A U.S. Department of 
Labor (DOL) survey found that in 2000, 100% of all poultry processing 
plants were non-compliant with federal wage and hour laws.21  A separate 
DOL survey found that in 1996, half of all garment-manufacturing 
businesses in New York City could be characterized as sweatshops, and a 
DOL survey in agriculture focused on cucumbers, lettuce, and onions 
revealed that compliance in these commodities was unacceptably low.22  
Injuries and deaths of Latino workers engaged in hazardous employment 
are extremely high and increasing.  In the year 2000, construction fatalities 
involving Latino workers increased by 24%, while Latino employment was 
up only six percent.23  New York has the nation’s highest rate of immigrants 
killed in the workplace, with foreign-born workers accounting for three out 
of every 10 deaths.24   
In 2001, farm workers employed in the production of crops accounted for 
only one percent of the workforce, but represented six percent of the 
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occupational deaths.25  In that year, there were forty-nine farm fatalities in 
the state of California alone.26  
Thus, it is no secret that many U.S. employers are hiring unauthorized 
workers and profiting from their labor. Both because of overt exclusions 
from the protection of domestic labor laws, and because of the practical and 
legal effects of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Hoffman, the task of enforcing workers’ rights has become increasingly 
more difficult.  The Hoffman decision has contributed to a general climate 
of fear among immigrant workers in the United States and a general 
reluctance, and often, inability, to enforce existing rights.  The following 
sections will examine that climate, employers’ willingness to hire the 
unauthorized, and the limitations of U.S. labor law that exacerbate the 
victimization of these workers. 
B. Case Examples: Unscrupulous Employers Use Extra-Judicial 
Threats to Suppress Exercise of Labor Rights. 
The practice of threatening to expose, and exposing, workers to the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service in order to suppress immigrant 
workers’ exercise of their labor rights has been a common one in the United 
States for many years.  For example:   
Victor Benavides began working as a boiler mechanic in 1990.  Before he 
was hired, the president of the corporation personally interviewed Mr. 
Benavides.  Mr. Benavides told the president that he was working 
unlawfully in the United States.  The president responded that he only 
needed a “legal” name so that Benavides could be listed on the company’s 
books.  Several months later, when Benavides and another undocumented 
worker, Alberto Guzman, became active in a union organizing drive, and in 
an atmosphere of  “flagrant and pervasive unfair labor practices,” the 
workers were fired.  One day after the union won the election, the employer 
asked the INS to investigate the legal status of its employees.27 
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In 1999, workers at a Holiday Inn Express hotel in Minneapolis voted to 
join the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees union.  A call to the 
INS by the employer resulted in the arrest of eight members of the union’s 
negotiating committee.28   
In 1996, the Teamsters’ and United Farm Workers’ unions began a joint 
organizing drive in Washington State’s lucrative apple industry, beginning 
with a packing company in Wenatchee, Washington.  One employee, Mary 
Mendez, quotes the employer’s anti-union consultant as having told the 
workers: “there hasn’t been a union here yet, and the INS hasn’t done any 
raids.  But with a union, the INS is going to be around.”  The union lost the 
subsequent election.29 
Silvia Contreras worked as a secretary for a company that sells 
commercial insurance to truck drivers.  In 1997, after Ms. Contreras filed a 
claim for unpaid wages and overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
her employer turned her in to the INS.30 
In U.S. v. Alzanki,31 an employer confined her immigrant employee to the 
apartment, forced her to work fifteen hour days, exposed her to noxious 
cleaning chemicals, and refused to provide medical treatment when the 
chemicals caused her illness.  The employer threatened her with deportation 
almost daily.  He was later convicted of holding her in involuntary 
servitude. 
In Gilbert, Arizona, female employees at Quality Art LLC, a picture 
frame manufacturing company, accused their employer of offensive and 
intrusive searches, as well as other harassment on the basis of sex, such as 
being assigned to sex-segregated positions.  The employer retaliated by 
terminating some employees, forcing some workers to quit their jobs based 
on the hostile work environment, and reported the women to the INS.  
Although INS officials said that they sympathized with the women—calling 
them “courageous” for coming forward—INS indicated that the women 
likely would be returned to their countries.32 
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Since the United States Supreme Court decision in Hoffman, 
unscrupulous employers’ threats of retaliation have continued unabated.  
Immediately after the Court’s ruling, an employer’s attorney in New York 
cited Hoffman when he issued a written threat of litigation against a 
community group that had announced the intention to protest unpaid wages.  
The attorney stated, falsely, that Hoffman had outlawed a demonstration by 
the group.33  
Four Peruvian farm workers filed a claim against their former employers 
for minimum wage and overtime violations, discrimination, and for housing 
them in substandard housing over a four-year period from 1997 through 
2001.  After their lawsuit was filed, the defendant’s father contacted the 
INS, and repeatedly pressured the agency to take enforcement action against 
the plaintiffs, claiming that the unpaid workers are both undocumented and 
“terrorists.”  When Hoffman was decided, the employer used it to argue—
incorrectly—that the workers were not protected by U.S. labor and 
employment law.34    
Alejandro Vazquez and David Sanchez both worked for a Michigan 
company as laborers.  Both were seriously injured in separate accidents at 
the workplace, suffering, respectively, a joint separation and a hand injury 
requiring several surgeries.  After the injuries, the employer received a letter 
indicating that the two did not have social security numbers, and questioned 
them about this fact in the workers’ compensation proceedings.  The 
employer fired both injured workers, and opposed the workers’ 
compensation claim on the basis that they were undocumented workers 
from Mexico. Their claims are pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals.  
The court has just determined that wage loss benefits are unavailable to 
undocumented injured workers in Michigan because they have committed a 
“crime” under state law by working illegally.35   
Twenty-two Mexican workers were recruited from California to work as 
carpenters on a power project in Texas.  This past summer, a local 
newspaper reported that after two weeks of work, the workers were told that 
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they would not be paid, and that they must leave or the contractor would 
call the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.  The workers were 
owed for two weeks of work at $12 to $16 per hour.36 Other examples are 
noted in the report, Used and Abused, compiled by the Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Education Fund and the National Employment Law 
Project, attached as Appendix B. 
C. The Employer Sanctions Scheme in the U.S. Poses No Deterrent to 
Employer Threats. 
1. Basics of the employer sanctions law. 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) contains an 
“employer sanctions” scheme that prohibits the employment of 
unauthorized aliens in the United States.37 IRCA established an 
“employment verification system” designed to deny employment to aliens 
who are not lawfully present in the United States, or who are not lawfully 
authorized to work in the United States.  IRCA mandates that employers 
verify the identity and eligibility of all new hires by examining specified 
documents before they begin work. 
Under the IRCA, if an immigrant job applicant is unable to present the 
required documentation, she cannot legally be hired.38 If an employer 
unknowingly hires an unauthorized alien, or if the alien becomes 
unauthorized while employed, the employer is compelled to discharge the 
worker upon discovery of the worker’s unauthorized status.  Employers 
who violate the law may be liable for civil fines and may be subject to 
criminal prosecution.  
IRCA also makes it a crime for an unauthorized alien to present 
fraudulent documents to his or her employer.39  Unauthorized immigrants 
who use or attempt to use fraudulent documents to subvert the employer 
verification system established by IRCA are subject to fines and criminal 
prosecution.40 
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2. Employer sanctions are not an effective deterrent to hiring 
unauthorized workers. 
As noted above, employer hiring of unauthorized immigrants continues 
unabated after IRCA.  Employers have little reason to fear that INS will 
sanction them for hiring unauthorized immigrants, and can easily come to 
see hiring of the unauthorized as a legitimate cost-saving decision.  This is 
because the employer sanction system is full of holes and left largely 
ignored by federal agencies. 
The language of the verification requirements provides employers with a 
“gaping loophole” that they exploit by hiring immigrants whom they know 
have presented fraudulent documents.41  Under IRCA, employers are only 
required to accept documents that appear on their face to be genuine and to 
relate to the individual named.42  This has meant that an employer can 
ignore documents it suspects are invalid, allow the worker to use documents 
that belong to another person, or even take part in procuring documents for 
the worker. “In effect, employers who are willing to comply just enough to 
avoid appearing to disregard the law totally, but who in fact continue to rely 
on unauthorized labor, are insulated from the law’s sanctions provisions.”43   
Even where employers fail utterly to comply with the law, average 
employer sanctions fines are low and rarely assessed.  In fiscal year 1999, 
the INS apprehended 1,714,035 aliens.  Of this number, the Border Patrol 
made 1,579,010 apprehensions, of which 97% were made along the 
southwest border.44  By contrast, the number of warnings to employers 
nationwide was 383, down 40% from 1998.  The INS issued only 417 
notices of intent to fine employers nationwide in 1999, a decrease of 59%.45   
In the year 2000, warnings to employers decreased another 26%, and 
notices of intent to fine decreased yet again, by 57%.46 
According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service itself, “Neither 
Republicans nor Democrats nor a broad range of interest groups is prepared 
to support an employer sanction program that actually would work.”47  
Thus, under the current legal scheme in the United States, employers may 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae Brief  811 
VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003 
readily hire unauthorized workers, take advantage of them, and then 
threaten to turn them in to the INS, all without fear of governmental action. 
3. Employers continue to hire unauthorized workers after IRCA 
because it is profitable. 
Unauthorized immigrants commonly will decline to report private or 
official abuse and are frequently unwilling to pursue civil claims in court.48 
The lack of access to safety-net programs such as unemployment insurance, 
food stamps, and welfare, supply further reasons for unauthorized workers 
to suffer workplace illegality without risking job separation.49   
In Dallas, Texas, the Regional Administrator of the Wage and Hour 
Division of the U.S. Department of Labor indicates that illegal immigrant 
workers endure sexual harassment, denial of overtime pay, and wages 
below the minimum federal standard because they are worried they will be 
deported.50 
When unauthorized workers are not protected by labor laws, 
unscrupulous employers are encouraged to hire them.  This, in turn, 
undermines the effectiveness of a country’s immigration laws.  When it 
considered the IRCA for passage, the United States Congress understood 
this dynamic.  In their consideration of IRCA, both houses of Congress 
agreed that employers easily abuse undocumented workers.  Each house 
concluded that undocumented immigrants, “out of desperation, will work in 
substandard conditions and for starvation wages.”51  For that reason, 
Congress stated that, after IRCA, labor laws should continue to protect the 
undocumented.52  Unfortunately, enforcement has not occurred.  As 
discussed in the next section, unauthorized workers and other immigrant 
workers remain unprotected by many U.S. employment laws, both by the 
Hoffman and other court decisions, and by express exclusions in state and 
federal law. 
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D. Court Decisions Deprive Certain Immigrants of Meaningful 
Remedies for Violation of their Rights. 
Immigrant workers in particular immigration categories, especially 
unauthorized immigrants, are expressly excluded from the remedies 
available to their U.S. citizen counterparts.  Here we outline the Hoffman 
decision and its effect on remedies available to unauthorized workers under 
U.S. law.  
1. Collective bargaining laws – Unauthorized workers not entitled to  
meaningful remedies for violation of their rights. 
The primary law under which workers are guaranteed the right to 
organize trade unions and bargain collectively in the United States is the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).53  Although unauthorized workers 
are considered “employees” under the NLRA,54 under current law, workers 
in irregular migratory status are not afforded the same remedies for 
violation of this right as are other workers.  In its March 2002 decision in 
Hoffman,55 the Supreme Court held that an unauthorized worker cannot 
recover the remedy of back pay for an unlawful termination under the 
National Labor Relations Act.   
The limitation on remedies afforded to unauthorized workers means that 
many workers will not exercise their rights to organize.  The limitation on 
remedies has also spilled over into other areas of law.  As noted in Section 
B, above, and the attached Report in Appendix B, some employers in the 
U.S. are attempting to use the Hoffman decision to limit undocumented 
workers’ rights in many areas. 
The Hoffman case involved a worker named José Castro.  Mr. Castro was 
working in a factory in California and was fired, along with other co-
workers, for his organizing activities. The National Labor Relations Board, 
the agency that administers the NLRA, ordered the employer to cease and 
desist, to post a notice that it had violated the law and to reinstate Mr. 
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Castro, and to provide him with back pay for the time he was not working 
because he had been illegally fired.   
During a hearing on his case, Mr. Castro admitted he had used false 
documents to establish work authorization and that he was an unauthorized 
worker.  The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately held that unauthorized workers 
cannot receive back pay under the National Labor Relations Act.  Under the 
Act, back pay is paid to a victim of an illegal anti-union firing in order to 
compensate him for wages he would have earned had he not been 
wrongfully fired.   
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that the 
“legal landscape [had] now significantly changed”56 since Congress had 
enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and its employer 
sanctions provisions. According to the Court, IRCA’s prohibition on 
employer hiring of unauthorized workers, and on workers’ acceptance of 
employment without work authorization requires the National Labor 
Relations Board to deny back pay to these workers, because back pay would 
compensate these workers for work they cannot lawfully perform.  
Neither the U.S. Constitution, nor any provision of IRCA or the NLRA 
prohibits back pay awards to unauthorized workers.  However, the Court 
refused to defer to the NLRA’s enforcement scheme because it reasoned 
that to do so would “trump” Congressional immigration policy.  It is 
important to note that the U.S. government pursued Castro’s case and 
defended the position that he was entitled to back pay before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.   
The Supreme Court did not have before it any arguments based on 
international law; nor were international legal precepts taken into 
consideration in its decision.  Nor did the Court, which decided the case by 
the slimmest of margins—five justices supporting the decision and four 
opposing—take into account the practical impact of its decision on the labor 
rights of international migrant workers. 
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Since the Hoffman decision, the National Labor Relations Board has 
stated that unauthorized workers will not be entitled to back pay, or to 
reinstatement when they are illegally fired, unless they can show that they 
now have lawful employment status.57  The Board’s policy does not 
distinguish between employers who knowingly hire workers who are 
unauthorized, in violation of U.S. law, and those who do not know of the 
worker’s illegal status at the time of hire. 
Back pay is the only meaningful remedy available to workers under the 
NLRA.  After Hoffman, the only remedies available to unauthorized 
immigrants in the U.S. are these: an employer who illegally fires an 
unauthorized worker might be ordered to post a notice about the violations 
of the law, and might be told to “cease and desist” violating the law.  In 
certain cases, an employer who violates the law again might be subject to 
penalties for contempt of court. Back pay is the only monetary 
compensation afforded under the National Labor Relations Act to victims of 
employer wrongdoing.  After the Court’s decision, this remedy is 
unavailable to unauthorized workers, with the result that workers will be 
much less likely to exercise their remaining rights, unscrupulous employers 
will have no reason to respect those rights, and law-abiding employers will 
be tempted to violate the law or face a competitive disadvantage. 
2. Discrimination laws—Unauthorized workers not entitled to equal 
remedies with authorized workers. 
The Hoffman decision also has important implications for the remedies 
available to unauthorized workers under the U.S. anti-discrimination laws. 
In the United States, Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act protects 
workers’ rights to be free from discrimination based on several factors:  sex, 
color, race, religion, and national origin.58 The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act protects workers’ rights to be free from discrimination 
based on age.59  The Americans with Disabilities Act protects workers’ 
rights to be free from discrimination based on disabilities.60  
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Unauthorized workers may not be entitled to back pay for wrongful 
termination under laws enforced by the EEOC. 
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the 
government agency that enforces most federal employment discrimination 
laws.  After the Hoffman decision, the EEOC rescinded its Enforcement 
Guidance on Remedies Available to Undocumented Workers.61  It noted that 
since its former practice of awarding back pay to undocumented workers 
was based on the NLRA, it was reviewing that practice in light of Hoffman.  
The EEOC’s statement leaves in doubt whether undocumented workers will 
be entitled to back pay under Title VII. 
Recently, a federal court in New York issued a troubling decision in a 
case involving violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, suggesting 
that Hoffman has made the issue of immigration status relevant to a 
worker’s standing to sue for relief under the anti-discrimination laws, and 
which may well serve as an indicator of things to come.    In denying a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss in Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd.,62 the judge noted: 
If Hoffman Plastic does deny undocumented workers the relief 
sought by plaintiff, then he would lack standing.  As that issue is 
not ripe for decision, we decline to rule on it at this time.  
However, if plaintiff were to admit to being in the United States 
illegally, or were to refuse to answer questions regarding his status 
on the grounds that it is not relevant, then the issue of his standing 
would properly be before us, and we would address the issue of 
whether Hoffman Plastic applies to ADA claims for compensatory 
and punitive damages brought by undocumented aliens.63 
Like denial of the back pay remedy under the National Labor Relations 
Act, denial of back pay to unauthorized immigrant victims of discrimination 
means that one of the most effective deterrents to further violations is no 
longer available.  It remains to be seen whether certain courts may limit 
unauthorized immigrant workers’ rights to receive other forms of monetary 
compensation for discrimination. 
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Unauthorized workers not protected at all against age discrimination in five 
states. 
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman, most courts in the 
country agreed that unauthorized immigrants were entitled to the protection 
of age discrimination laws.  In one case, however, prior to Hoffman, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, covering the states of Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia, had held that an 
individual without work authorization was not “qualified” for the job, and 
therefore not protected by the federal law against age discrimination in 
employment.64   
Foreign nationals under H-2A visa program excluded from protection of 
law in five states.   
The same court has also held that the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act did not protect a foreign nationals applying for a job from outside the 
United States under the H-2A visa program because he was not authorized 
to work at the time of his job application, and therefore not qualified for the 
job.65 
3. Minimum wage and overtime violations—workers’ rights to back pay 
for retaliatory firings not clear. 
 In the United States, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act guarantees a 
minimum wage, currently $5.15 per hour, and a right to overtime pay for 
hours worked over forty in a week for covered workers.66  The law is 
explicitly intended to protect the wages of low-income workers, and to 
protect law-abiding employers from the unfair competition that results from 
unscrupulous employers’ payment of unfairly low wages.67 
Prior to Hoffman, the Eleventh Circuit had held that an unauthorized 
worker was eligible for unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act in 
Patel v. Quality Inn South.68  The court concluded that, “the Fair Labor 
Standards Act’s coverage of unauthorized aliens is fully consistent with the 
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IRCA and the policies behind it.”69  Moreover, the court concluded that the 
plaintiff was eligible for back pay on the basis that the plaintiff was “not 
attempting to recover back pay for being unlawfully deprived of a job.  
Rather, he simply seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime for 
work already performed.”70   
Hoffman leaves intact the right to minimum wage and overtime pay under 
the FLSA since Hoffman deals only with back pay for work not performed.  
The U.S. Department of Labor, the federal agency charged with enforcing 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, has stated that the Department “will fully and 
vigorously enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act without regard to whether 
an employee is documented or undocumented.”71  However, the Department 
has not made clear its view on unauthorized immigrants’ entitlement to 
back pay for retaliatory discharges, saying that it is “still considering” 
Hoffman’s effect on this remedy.72   
E. U.S. Laws Explicitly Exempt Certain Immigrants from Workplace 
Protections. 
As noted above, the Hoffman decision has resulted in a diminution of the 
remedies available to unauthorized workers under U.S. laws protecting the 
right to organize and protecting workers from discrimination in 
employment.  In addition, even prior to Hoffman, some U.S. laws have 
expressly discriminated against workers in certain immigration categories, 
including both unauthorized workers and other workers in particular visa 
categories.  This section outlines those laws. 
1. Workers’ rights to be compensated for on the job injuries limited in 
some states. 
Workers’ compensation is a state system that provides remuneration for 
employees who have been injured while working on the job.  In general, it 
covers the medical costs of an injured employee, and allows a worker to 
continue to be partially paid during the period he or she is unable to work. 
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Workers’ compensation laws also provide compensation for disabilities and 
for the family of an employee who dies on the job.  In the United States, 
workers give up their right to sue an employer for unhealthy conditions on 
the job that cause them injuries.  In return, workers receive certain benefits 
for any on the job injury through the workers’ compensation system, 
whether or not the employer causes the injury.  Though workers’ 
compensation is generally an issue of state law, and the state laws vary, 
generally workers receive medical payments, partial replacement of wages, 
pensions, death benefits, and sometimes retraining for new jobs. 
In most states, unauthorized workers are covered under the law.   
The majority of the States’ workers’ compensation laws include “aliens” 
in the definition of covered employees.73  Entitlement to lost wages under 
state workers’ compensation laws turns on state statutes and their definition 
of “worker” or “employee.”  State courts in California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas have specifically held that unauthorized 
workers are covered under their state workers’ compensation laws.74  
However, at least one state, Wyoming, explicitly denies workers’ 
compensation benefits to unauthorized immigrants.75   
At least two states deny certain rehabilitation benefits to unauthorized 
workers.   
Vocational rehabilitation benefits are normally provided for workers who 
have been injured on the job as part of the overall workers’ compensation 
benefits package. Vocational rehabilitation is granted so that an injured 
employee may be retrained to perform the same job, or to perform a 
different job at the same company. Courts in the states of Nevada and 
California have concluded that unauthorized workers are not entitled to 
vocational rehabilitation benefits under certain circumstances.76 
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Death benefits for non-residents limited in some states.   
Workers’ compensation laws in many states bar the non-resident family 
members of workers killed on the job from receiving full benefits.  In those 
states, whenever the family member is living outside the United States and 
is not a United States citizen, the family members do not receive the full 
death benefits award.  There are several ways in which states limit 
compensation to nonresident alien beneficiaries. Some states limit 
compensation compared to the benefits a lawful resident would have 
received, generally 50% (Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina).77  Some states restrict the 
types of non-resident dependents who are eligible to receive benefits as 
beneficiaries (Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Pennsylvania).  
Other states limit coverage based on: the length of time a migrant has been 
a citizen (Wisconsin), the laws of the alien resident beneficiary’s home 
country (Washington), or the cost of living in the alien resident 
beneficiary’s home country (Oregon).78 Alabama denies benefits to all 
foreign beneficiaries.79  Although these laws do not explicity discriminate 
on the basis of alienage alone, they disproportionately deny equal benefits 
to non-nationals, who are most likely to have beneficiaries who are non-
resident aliens.   
New rulings may endanger unauthorized workers’ entitlement to wage loss 
compensation.   
Since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Hoffman, employers in two states 
have challenged unauthorized workers’ entitlement to workers’ 
compensation coverage, or to elements of that coverage.  The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania has held that, while an injured unauthorized worker 
is entitled to medical benefits, illegal immigration status would justify 
terminating benefits for temporary total disability (wage loss) benefits.80  
Very recently, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided that wage loss 
benefits may be cut off to undocumented workers as of the date that the 
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employer “discovers” that the worker is unauthorized.  Cases like these 
encourage unscrupulous employers to suddenly “discover” a workers’ 
unauthorized status as soon as he or she suffers an on the job injury, thereby 
lowering the employer’s workers’ compensation premiums.81   
2. H-2A workers denied many employment protections. 
Approximately 40,000 workers who are admitted to the United States 
annually as temporary non-immigrant workers to perform agricultural work 
under the H-2A program, most of whom are from Mexico, are denied many 
basic federal employment protections.82  H-2A workers are excluded from 
the protections of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection 
Act (MSAWPA), which is the principal federal employment law for 
agricultural workers.83  This exclusion has many serious effects.  H-2A 
migrant workers, unlike other farm workers, are not entitled to disclosures 
about the job terms at the time they are recruited.84  Indeed, the recruiter 
need not even tell the worker for whom he will be working for in the United 
States.  The labor contractors used to recruit and hire H-2A workers need 
not be registered and monitored by the U.S. Department of Labor.  The 
MSAWPA’s transportation safety standards and vehicle insurance 
requirements for migrant workers are inapplicable to H-2A workers,85 and 
H-2A workers are denied the full monetary remedies provided by the 
MSAWPA as well as the ability to sue in federal court.86    
H-2A workers’ permission to remain lawfully in the United States is tied 
to only one employer.  These workers therefore lack the freedom to leave 
abusive employers and seek other employment in the United States.87  In 
addition to the general exclusion of agricultural workers from the collective 
bargaining protections of the NLRA, H-2A workers are denied rights to 
freedom of association to demand higher wage rates or better working 
conditions as a practical matter, because employers are legally permitted to 
reject such demands and to fire and deport H-2A workers who make them.   
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3. Citizenship discrimination law excludes unauthorized immigrants. 
Immigrants without work authorization are excluded from the protection 
of the Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices Act, which 
protects against discrimination based on citizenship and national origin in 
employment.88  This Act was passed at the same time as the IRCA, and was 
intended to protect immigrants from discrimination that might result from 
the imposition of IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions. 
4. Immigrant workers’ rights of access to legal representation 
restricted. 
In 1974, the U.S. Congress passed the Legal Services Corporation Act 
(LSCA), which was designed to provide equal access to the civil justice 
system for people who cannot afford lawyers.89  To this end, the LSCA 
created the Legal Services Corporation, an independent corporation that 
makes grants to legal aid programs.90   One of the key reasons that working 
people need access to the civil justice system is to enforce their labor rights.  
As a practical matter, without the means to bring suit in court, workers’ 
rights cannot be adequately enforced.91    
Certain immigrants, including the unauthorized and H-2B workers, have no 
right to legal assistance.   
Legal Services Corporation programs are prohibited from providing legal 
assistance “for or on behalf of” most immigrant workers who are not lawful 
permanent residents.92  This ban on representation prohibits representing 
unauthorized workers, as well as many categories of workers who are 
legally admitted to work in the United States, such as workers admitted to 
perform unskilled non-agricultural labor under the H-2B program.  Legal 
aid programs can be fined or have their funding taken away if they are 
found to have provided services to unauthorized workers.  Without the help 
of legal services, low-wage immigrant workers cannot afford to hire an 
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attorney to press their legal cases.  Therefore, they are effectively prevented 
from enforcing their remaining rights. 
II. U.S. Employment Laws Concerning Migrant Workers Violate 
Fundamental International Norms of Nondiscrimination and Freedom of 
Association. 
States historically have asserted the right to restrict the rights and 
activities of foreign nationals based on either their non-citizen or 
immigration status for a variety of reasons.  International law recognizes the 
right of states to control movement across their borders as a matter both of 
sovereignty and of national security.93  States have exercised this right 
through direct measures such as physical border controls, visa and entry 
permits, and quotas that limit the number and nationality of people who 
may enter the country.  States also have sought to control immigration 
through indirect measures, such as limits on access to employment or denial 
of access to public benefits.  States furthermore have denied aliens rights 
that arguably are owed only to individuals who are citizens or official 
members of the political community, such as the rights to vote, to hold 
public office, to engage in certain political activities, and to hold certain 
civil service jobs.94   States also have discriminated against non-nationals 
for purely xenophobic reasons through restrictions on social and cultural 
life, such as bans on inter-ethnic marriage or the teaching of foreign 
languages. 
Although international law recognizes the right of states to control their 
borders, international law prohibits many forms of discrimination against 
non-nationals, whether or not the individuals are legally present in the state.  
No state, for example, can claim the right to commit genocide or torture 
against non-nationals.  As discussed below, non-nationals also are protected 
by fundamental human rights in the workplace such as the prohibition 
against discrimination and the protection of freedom of association.   
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U.S. employment laws discriminate against migrant workers based on a 
number of criteria, such as the worker’s possession of a valid work 
authorization or a particular visa status, the presence of the worker’s alien 
relatives outside the country, or the worker’s unlawful immigration status. 
The denial of meaningful remedies for violations of freedom of association 
under Hoffman, and the denial of workers’ compensation and vocational 
rehabilitation benefits in some states, turn on whether an immigrant 
(whether lawfully present in the country or not) possesses a legal work 
authorization.  The restrictions on the rights of H-2A workers are tied to the 
particular visa status of such workers as lawful temporary non-immigrants.  
Restrictions on death benefits to non-resident alien beneficiaries disparately 
impact immigrant workers and their alien dependents.  Further, migrants 
who are not lawfully present in the United States are denied access to 
federally-funded legal services representation in employment and other 
claims. 
Amici do not contest that states have a right under international law to 
control their borders.  Nor do they contend, for purposes of this brief, that 
states cannot deny the right to employment to certain immigrants as part of 
an immigration control policy.  Amici contend instead that once an alien is 
physically present in a country’s territory and secures employment, denial 
of fundamental workplace protections to that immigrant worker violates 
fundamental international human rights norms regarding nondiscrimination 
and freedom of association.  As discussed herein, international treaties that 
are binding in some form on the United States make clear that fundamental 
human rights protections, including nondiscrimination and freedom of 
association, protect individuals in the workplace, regardless of the worker’s 
nationality or immigration status.  
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A. U.S. Employment Laws Violate the Prohibition Against 
Discrimination 
Numerous international instruments binding on the United States 
likewise establish a universal norm of nondiscrimination that protects all 
persons within a state’s jurisdiction. The U.N. Human Rights Committee 
has established that most of the provisions of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) apply equally to aliens, including the 
Article 2 and Article 26 prohibitions on discrimination, and that differences 
in treatment based on alienage or nationality constitute discrimination when 
they are not based on objective and reasonable criteria. The Committee’s 
interpretation of this standard supports a finding that the differential 
employment laws outlined above violate Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR. A 
similar norm of nondiscrimination is recognized by the instruments of the 
Inter-American system and supports the conclusion that U.S. laws denying 
workplace protections on the basis of nationality or immigration status 
violate Article II of the American Declaration. The International Labour 
Organization (ILO) has concluded that the principle of nondiscrimination is 
a fundamental human right which protects all individuals in the workplace, 
regardless of their nationality or immigration status.  And although some of 
the substantive employment benefits addressed in this brief, such as 
workers’ compensation, may not themselves be fundamental rights under 
international law, discrimination in such benefits based on criteria that are 
not objective and reasonable violates fundamental international human 
rights law. 
1. Binding treaty provisions 
The right to nondiscrimination is one of the most fundamental human 
rights recognized by international law.  Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. 
Charter pledge all member states to respect  “human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,”95 
and recognize that such protection is “necessary for peaceful and friendly 
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relations among nations.”96  The principle of nondiscrimination has been 
further elaborated to prohibit discrimination based on nationality or other 
status in the following treaty provisions that are applicable to the United 
States:  
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADHR or 
American Declaration)97 
Article II: 
All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties 
established in this Declaration without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
creed or any other factor. 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR or American 
Convention)98 
Article 1: 
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights 
and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to 
their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and 
freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, economic status, birth or any other social condition. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, “person” means every human 
being. 
Article 24: 
All persons are equal before the law.  Consequently, they are entitled, 
without discrimination, to equal protection of the law. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)99  
Article 26: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law.  In this respect, the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
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effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)100 
Article 2(2): 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the 
rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.101 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)102 
Article 2 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. 
Article 7 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law.  All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to 
such discrimination. 
ILO Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Employment103 
Article 1(1):  
For the purpose of this Convention the term discrimination includes—(a) 
any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, 
sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which 
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has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment 
in employment or occupation. 
Article 2: 
Each Member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to declare 
and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate 
to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in 
respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any 
discrimination in respect thereof. 
The ILO has identified the prohibition against discrimination in 
employment as one of four “core” worker rights that are internationally 
recognized as fundamental human rights (the other core rights are freedom 
of association, and the prohibition against forced and child labor),104 and 
thus are binding on all ILO members.105 
The plain language of the specific nondiscrimination provisions 
discussed above suggests that these international instruments prohibit 
employment discrimination on the basis of alienage.  As discussed more 
fully below, the language of the nondiscrimination provisions is 
unambiguously universal.  The equality provisions declare that “all 
persons” or individuals are equal, not merely “all citizens” or even “all 
persons lawfully present in a country.”  The instruments also explicitly 
prohibit discrimination based on national or social origin and other status.   
Furthermore, the overall language and structure of the instruments listed 
above supports the interpretation that aliens are entitled to the treaty’s 
substantive work-related protections.  Like the specific nondiscrimination 
provisions, the instruments’ other substantive provisions are generally 
applicable to all persons.  Unlike the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
the Inter-American instruments, the ICCPR, ICESCR, Universal 
Declaration, and ILO Conventions do not provide for general exceptions 
based on citizenship or immigration status.106  Moreover, the jurisprudence 
of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American human rights 
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bodies and the ILO support a finding that international law prohibits 
denying workplace rights to aliens who are actually employed, regardless of 
their immigration status, at least with respect to fundamental rights such as 
nondiscrimination and freedom of association.  The language and 
interpretation of the ICCPR, Inter-American instruments, ICESCR, and ILO 
Convention No. 111 are each addressed in turn, below.   
2. Aliens are protected by the ICCPR, and cannot be discriminated 
against in either Covenant or non-Covenant rights absent reasonable and 
objective criteria.   
The plain language and negotiating history of the ICCPR and 
interpretations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee establish that aliens 
are entitled to the protections of the ICCPR, with a few limited exceptions, 
and that the principle of non-discrimination under the ICCPR applies fully 
to aliens.  In other words, states cannot discriminate on the basis of 
nationality or other status under the ICCPR unless the distinction is based 
on reasonable and objective criteria.   
Only three provisions of the ICCPR expressly distinguish between 
citizens and aliens. Article 25, regarding “Political Rights,” recognizes 
rights only for citizens to participate in government, to vote, and to public 
service, while Article 13 prohibits the arbitrary expulsion of aliens.  Articles 
12 and 13 further permit States parties to deny a very narrow range of rights 
to undocumented non-citizens, such as the freedom of movement and the 
right to choose one’s residence (Art. 12), and the right to certain procedural 
protections in expulsion proceedings (Art. 13), each of which applies only 
to aliens “lawfully within the territory” of a State party.107  According to the 
CCPR Commentary,108 the focus on lawful aliens in Article 12 reflects the 
view that “aliens located on the territory of a State party have the same 
claim as citizens to respect for and protection of the rights guaranteed by the 
ICCPR…; [although] the decision on whether they are permitted to be in 
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the territory of a State Party remains the sole matter of the State 
concerned.”109 
Other than these specific provisions that distinguish between citizens and 
aliens or between legal and illegal aliens, the ICCPR expressly allows for 
discrimination against non-citizens only “[i]n time of public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation” and then only “to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation,”110 circumstances which 
certainly are not presented here.   Under the principle of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, therefore, aliens are entitled to the other protections of the 
ICCPR.   
Moreover, although Articles 2 and 26 expressly secure ICCPR rights and 
prohibit discrimination only on the basis of national origin and other status, 
rather than expressly on nationality, the negotiating history indicates that 
one of the primary purposes of Article 2 was to prohibit discrimination 
against aliens in ICCPR rights.111  Negotiating states repeatedly noted that 
Articles 2 and 26 should not prohibit all unequal treatment of aliens,112 but 
the absence of any express provision in the ICCPR for distinctions based on 
alienage (other than in Articles 12, 13, and 25), led several states to enter 
reservations that would allow differential treatment of aliens in certain 
circumstances.113 
Consistent with the plain language of the ICCPR and its negotiating 
history, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) has ruled that 
most state obligations under the treaty apply equally to non-nationals.114  In 
its General Comment on the Position of Aliens, the Committee rejects the 
suggestion that states are entitled to deny or limit aliens’ protections under 
the Covenant.  As stated by the Committee:   
[E]ach State party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to ‘all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’. . . . In 
general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone, 
irrespective of his nationality or statelessness. Thus, the general 
rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be 
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.  
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Aliens receive the benefit of the general requirement of non-
discrimination in respect of the rights guaranteed in the Covenant, 
as provided for in article 2 thereof.115 
The Committee’s General Comment notes that of the rights set forth in 
the Covenant, only political rights such as the vote in Article 25 are limited 
to citizens.116  The Committee specifically observed that aliens are entitled 
to the Covenant’s protections regarding nondiscrimination and freedom of 
association, among others.117 
The General Comment recognizes that states have the right, in principle, 
to decide whom to admit into their territory, and that states may condition 
permission to enter by imposing some restrictions on movement, residence, 
and employment.118  The Committee noted, however, that “in certain 
circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in 
relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-
discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life 
arise.”119  The Comment further notes that once an alien is lawfully present 
in a country, his or her freedom of movement can be restricted only under 
the conditions set forth in Article 12(3) of the ICCPR120 and in a manner 
with the other rights recognized by the ICCPR.121 
Moreover, the Committee confirmed that entitlement to most of the 
ICCPR’s protections is not limited to aliens who are legally present.  The 
General Comment noted that Article 13’s restriction to legal aliens was an 
exception to the general principle that the ICCPR’s protections apply to all 
persons in a State’s territory.122  And even here, the Committee observed 
that “[d]iscrimination may not be made between different categories of 
aliens in the application of article 13.”123 
a. U.S. employment restrictions violate ICCPR Articles 2 and 26 
The prohibitions of discrimination under ICCPR Articles 2 and 26 are 
both relevant to the question before this Court.  Article 2 bars 
discrimination in the rights that are protected by the ICCPR (such as 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae Brief  831 
VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003 
discrimination in freedom of association), while Article 26 prohibits 
discrimination in substantive rights and benefits that are not, themselves, 
mandated by the ICCPR.124  
Under both Articles 2 and 26, whether a distinction based on alienage or 
other criteria is prohibited turns on whether the distinction is based on 
reasonable and objective criteria, and whether the distinction is 
proportional in a given case.125  The prohibited bases for discrimination 
listed in Articles 2 and 26 (distinctions on grounds of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status) are not comprehensive, but represent 
particularly reprehensible distinctions that are especially likely to be found 
to be violations.126    
In elaborating on these principles in the Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries 
cases, involving gender discrimination under the Dutch Unemployment 
Benefits Act, the Human Rights Committee reasoned that equal protection 
of the law “prohibits discrimination in law or in practice in any field 
regulated and protected by public authorities,” but that not all differences in 
treatment are discriminatory, since “[a] differentiation based on reasonable 
and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within 
the meaning of Art. 26.”127  The Committee nevertheless found that Article 
26 had been violated, since the unemployment law discriminated on the 
basis of sex—an unreasonable criterion.   
Likewise, in Gueye v. France,128 the Committee applied this test to find 
that a French employment law disadvantaging non-nationals violated 
Article 26. The case was brought by a group of Senegalese nationals who 
had served in the French military during the colonial era, and who were 
provided lower pensions for their military service than French nationals.129 
The Committee noted that Article 26 expressly prohibits discrimination 
only on the basis of “national origin,” not on nationality per se, but 
nevertheless concluded that the French law’s differentiation based on 
citizenship constituted a distinction based on “other status” under Article 
832 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
EMPLOYMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW 
26. The Committee also found that Article 26 had been violated, despite the 
fact that the ICCPR does not expressly protect the right to a pension.130 
The Committee concluded that France’s justifications for the 
discrimination against non-nationals were not based on “reasonable and 
objective criteria,” and thus were not permissible.131 The Committee 
reasoned that the pension program’s purpose was to reward veterans for 
their service to the government, and that the nationality of the recipient was 
therefore irrelevant.132 The Committee stated that  “[a] subsequent change 
in nationality cannot by itself be considered as a sufficient justification for 
different treatment, since the basis for the grant of the pension was the same 
service which both they and the soldiers who remained French had 
provided.”133 
The Gueye analysis is directly relevant to U.S. employment laws limiting 
protections for legal migrant workers, and it seems clear that many, if not 
all, of these provisions violate Articles 2 and 26 under the Committee’s 
reasoning.  The Gueye case illustrates a number of points relevant to the 
question before this Court.  First, it reaffirms the Human Rights 
Committee’s position that provisions of the ICCPR (and, amici argue, of 
human rights treaties generally), are applicable to non-nationals absent 
express language to the contrary. Even though the ICCPR does not 
expressly address discrimination based on nationality, the Gueye case 
confirms that the treaty bars distinctions based on nationality or alienage, 
like other distinctions, unless they are reasonable and objective. 
Second, the Gueye case demonstrates that distinctions based on alienage 
violate Article 26 even if the ICCPR does not expressly protect the 
substantive benefit at issue (in this case, a right to pensions). In addition to 
discrimination in freedom of association, an ICCPR right which cannot be 
denied in a discriminatory manner under Article 2, the other employment 
benefits at issue in this case are protected by many substantive treaty 
provisions binding on this country, including the rights to fair remuneration, 
proper working conditions, and effective recourse through legal aid.  (For 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae Brief  833 
VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003 
the relevant treaty provisions, see Appendix C, Tables 1-5).  The Gueye 
case stands for the proposition that discrimination in these benefits is 
improper, absent a reasonable and objective basis, even if the substantive 
rights themselves are not fundamental, or even recognized by the ICCPR.   
In fact, the pension plan at issue in Gueye is closely analogous to the 
various U.S. states’ death benefit schemes which discriminate against 
decedents (the vast majority of whom are aliens) whose beneficiaries are 
aliens not residing in the U.S.  Although these death benefit schemes do not 
facially discriminate on the basis of nationality, in contrast to the French 
pension scheme in Gueye, like the French pension plan, their clear purpose 
is to deny equal benefits to non-resident aliens in a manner which is not tied 
to the actual cost of living in the particular locale where the beneficiary 
resides.  Under the Gueye analysis, discrimination in such benefits may be 
impermissible even if the benefits themselves are not mandated by the 
ICCPR.  
Finally, the Gueye decision makes clear that in determining whether 
discrimination in an employment benefit is reasonable and objective, and 
therefore permissible, a court should examine the underlying purpose of the 
employment law at issue to determine whether the distinction employed is 
relevant to achieving that purpose.  The U.S. laws workplace protections 
that discriminate on the basis of alienage or immigration status fail under 
this test.  Employment benefits such as protection of freedom of association, 
workers’ compensation, and access to legal services fundamentally serve 
the purpose of protecting employees at work, and most effectively achieve 
their purpose when applied and enforced equally with respect to all 
workers.  Once an alien is employed, that employee’s nationality, or even 
his or her legal status, is irrelevant to the employment law’s goal of 
protecting individuals in the workplace and preventing exploitation. Indeed, 
allowing such laws to be applied differentially to non-citizen or 
unauthorized workers will only undermine the rights of other workers, 
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promote labor exploitation, and adversely affect the laws’ underlying 
protective goal.  
The Gueye case did not directly address the issue of immigration control, 
which is likely to be the primary governmental motive offered to justify 
limiting worker protections for unauthorized workers.  But immigration 
control cannot be viewed as the primary purpose of employment protection 
laws, and the United States’ restrictions on the employment protections of 
aliens do not objectively and reasonably serve this purpose.  Given the fact 
that even employer sanctions laws have not curbed the entry of 
undocumented persons into the United States, it seems fantastic to argue 
that denying aliens fundamental rights to freedom of association, workers’ 
compensation, vocational training, death benefits or legal representation 
could accomplish U.S. immigration goals. Furthermore, the justification of 
immigration control does not plausibly apply to restrictions on the rights of 
lawfully present and authorized workers in the United States, such as the 
denial of freedom of association to H-2A workers.   
In sum, amici recognize that states retain the authority under the ICCPR 
to decide whether to admit aliens.  For the purposes of this case, amici do 
not dispute that a state may have the right to deny employment to aliens 
altogether under certain circumstances, in order to further its border control 
policy.  However, once an alien is present in a state’s territory and actually 
working, that alien is fully entitled to the ICCPR’s workplace protections, 
and distinctions based on alienage are permissible only when based on 
reasonable and objective criteria.  Distinctions in employment protections 
are legitimate only if nationality or immigration status is somehow 
objectively and reasonably relevant to achieving the employment 
protection’s goal.  Applying this standard to the question before the Court 
should lead this Court to conclude that differential application of 
employment protections to aliens who are present and working in a state’s 
territory cannot be justified. Every worker in America is contributing to our 
society, and has need of protection in his or her role as a worker. Any 
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employment situation is fraught with unique vulnerabilities. These 
vulnerabilities, compounded in the case of a foreign worker, are an 
inappropriate—and, as demonstrated above, ineffective—vehicle for 
migration policy.  Far from being a reasonable and objective path toward 
migration control, differential labor protections for migrant workers merely 
represent the receiving country’s ability to take advantage of workers whose 
bargaining power is wiped out by unemployment and deprivations in their 
homelands.   
b. U.S. employment restrictions violate the American Declaration 
The plain language and expressio unius arguments set forth above 
regarding the ICCPR are equally applicable to the American Declaration 
and Convention.  The language of the Inter-American instruments is 
universal, and does not expressly provide for distinctions on the basis of 
alienage or immigration status.  Like the ICCPR, the American Convention 
limits rights of freedom of movement and residence and procedural 
protections in expulsion proceedings to aliens “lawfully in the territory of a 
State Party” (Article 22), and permits limitations on rights of political 
participation on the basis of citizenship, nationality, and residence (Article 
23).  The treaty, however, otherwise does not distinguish on these grounds.  
Moreover, Article 29 of the Convention provides that no restrictions may be 
imposed on Convention rights other than those provided for in the treaty,134 
while Article 30 provides that even the restrictions authorized under the 
Convention “may not be applied except in accordance with laws enacted for 
reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which 
such restrictions have been established.”135 
The nondiscrimination jurisprudence of the Inter-American system 
substantially comports with that under the ICCPR and supports the 
conclusion that U.S. employment laws improperly discriminate against 
immigrant workers.  This Court’s 1984 Advisory Opinion on the Proposed 
Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa 
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Rica laid down the fundamental principle that state sovereignty over 
immigration does not trump human rights: 
[D]espite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral 
and regulation of nationality are matters for each state to decide, 
contemporary developments indicate that international law does 
impose certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by the states in 
that area, and that the manners in which states regulate matters 
bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within their sole 
jurisdiction; those powers of the state are also circumscribed by 
their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights.136 
The Court went on to discuss Costa Rica’s proposed naturalization rule in 
light of the American Convention’s nondiscrimination provisions. It stated 
that:  
[E]quality springs from the oneness of the human family and is 
linked to the essential dignity of the individual…[i]t 
is…irreconcilable with that notion to characterize a group as 
inferior and treat it with hostility or otherwise subject it to 
discrimination in the enjoyment of rights which are accorded to 
others not so classified. It is impermissible to subject human 
beings to differences in treatment that are inconsistent with their 
unique and congenerous character.137  
The Court continued to establish a reasonable proportionality test for 
nondiscrimination under the Convention.  The Court held that 
discrimination exists “when the classifications selected are based on 
substantial factual differences and there exists a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between these differences and the aims of the legal rule 
under review.”138 The Court then went on to examine the proposed 
naturalization restrictions on the basis of whether the restrictions were 
“inconsistent with the nature and purpose of the grant of nationality.”139  
In a recent contentious case decision applying the standards laid down by 
this Court, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that the 
United States had violated the right to equality of a group of migrants being 
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held in indefinite detention.140  In so doing, the Commission required that 
distinctions be based on reasonable and objective criteria, and be reasonably 
proportional to the objective being pursued.  Thus, “[t]he right to equality 
includes the prerequisite of an objective and reasonable justification as a 
distinction basis.”141  The Commission found that “even though differences 
in the treatment of nationals and foreigners are admitted with respect to the 
entrance and permanence in the territory of any given country, the State has 
to demonstrate that distinctions of this nature are reasonable and 
proportionate with the objective they pursue.”142  In other words, even 
sovereign state decisions regarding entrance and duration of stay must be 
objective, reasonable, and proportional. As argued above, conditioning 
workplace protections on citizenship or immigration status is not reasonably 
related or proportional to an immigration-related objective.  
Special note should also be made of the centrality of the rights at issue 
for immigrant workers in the United States. Worker rights in the Americas 
begin with the OAS Charter, which refers to the specific importance of 
worker rights three times and makes numerous other provisions for 
protecting work-related benefits. The Inter-American Charter of Social 
Guarantees143 was adopted by the same conference that produced the OAS 
Charter and the American Declaration.  The Charter includes thirty-eight 
substantive articles detailing labor rights written “in the belief…that it is to 
the public interest…to give workers guarantees and rights on a scale not 
lower than that fixed in the Conventions and Recommendations of the 
[ILO].”144 As a detailed statement of rights contemporaneous with the 
American Declaration, the Charter is an additional indicator of the centrality 
of worker rights in the Americas. 
c. Other international instruments also protect the fundamental right to 
nondiscrimination in the workplace for immigrant workers.   
Other international treaties and declarations applicable to the United 
States also confirm that basic principles of nondiscrimination apply to 
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workplace protections without distinction based on nationality or immigrant 
status.   
Like the ICCPR and the instruments of the Inter-American system, 
Article 2(2) of the ICESCR forbids discrimination on the basis, inter alia, 
of national or social origin, birth, or other status, and expressly establishes 
rights that apply to all.  Thus, Article 6 grants everyone the right to work; 
Article 7 grants everyone just and favorable working conditions; Article 8 
ensures everyone the right to establish trade unions; Article 9 guarantees the 
right to social security for everyone, and Article 11 ensures the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living including adequate food, 
clothing, housing, and the continuous improvement of living conditions.  
The only exception to the principle of nondiscrimination recognized by the 
ICESCR is the Article 2(3) exception for developing countries, which is not 
applicable to discriminatory laws adopted by the United States.145  
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
has addressed the situation of migrant workers in several contexts, making 
clear its determination to extend the protections of the ICESCR to this 
vulnerable group. In Concluding Observations reviewing state performance 
under the ICESCR, the Committee has expressed concern over foreign 
workers’ “appalling…working conditions,”146 discrimination against 
immigrants and refugees in the workplace,147 and acts of discrimination and 
racism against “illegal workers.”148 Also in its supervisory capacity, the 
Committee has requested that States Party ensure that foreign workers enjoy 
specific rights, including: the right to hold trade union office;149 to be 
“adequately compensated” after working legally, contributing to the social 
security system, and subsequently being expelled;150 and the right to the 
same vocational guidance and training courses as those offered to 
nationals.151 The Committee has pressed specific states to “effectively” 
implement job security laws, “especially as regards the most vulnerable 
groups, including foreigners”152 and to allow foreign domestic helpers to 
“freely seek employment” upon expiration of their contracts.153 The 
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Committee has also monitored states’ efforts to further the integration of 
foreign workers.154 
The ILO Committee of Experts similarly has concluded that the 
fundamental principle of nondiscrimination in employment protected by 
Convention No. 111 applies to both nationals and non-nationals, and does 
not distinguish on the basis of an immigrant worker’s lawful or unlawful 
status.155  In one case, for example, the Committee of Experts found that 
poor working conditions, violence, and abuse against unlawful agricultural 
migrant workers constituted “acts of discrimination on the basis of race, 
colour, religion and national extraction.”156 As discussed further with 
respect to freedom of association, below, the ILO reiterated this view in its 
recent opinion on migrant workers.157 
Finally in 1985, the U.N. General Assembly adopted, by consensus, 
Resolution 40/144 containing the Declaration on the Human Rights of 
Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, 
which covers all non-nationals, including migrant workers, refugees, 
documented and undocumented aliens, and individuals who have lost their 
nationality.158  The Declaration provides for respect for fundamental human 
rights of all aliens, including equality before the courts and tribunals 
(Article 5), trade union rights, the right to safe and healthy working 
conditions and the right to medical care, social security, and education 
(Article 8).159  
Indeed, a comprehensive examination of the principle of equal protection 
for non-citizens under international law has led the United Nations to 
conclude as follows:  
In general, international human rights law requires equal 
treatment of citizens and non-citizens.  The exceptions to that non-
discrimination principle are narrow and must be strictly construed.  
In general, differential treatment of non-citizens may be acceptable 
only if based on reasonable and objective criteria and designed to 
achieve a legitimate purpose.  With respect to civil and political 
rights, in times of domestic stability States may distinguish among 
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citizens and non-citizens only as to political participation rights 
and certain rights of entry and residence.  Developing countries 
may, to the extent necessary, differentiate among citizens and non-
citizens in the area of economic rights. . . . 
The extent of permissible differential treatment among non-
citizens is somewhat broader.  Instances of differentiation of this 
type arise primarily in the regulation of entry, residence, and 
naturalization of aliens—areas in which States have traditionally 
exercised substantial discretion.  Permissible distinctions among 
non-citizens would appear to be limited to preferences extended to 
the nationals of certain countries, such as other members of a 
supranational political or economic entity, rather than the 
imposition of more onerous conditions on citizens of selected 
countries.160 
B. U.S. Laws Discriminating Against Migrants Violate Freedom of 
Association Under International Law  
In addition to violating the principle of nondiscrimination under 
international law, U.S. employment laws that fail to protect freedom of 
association for unauthorized and other immigrant workers also violate the 
fundamental international norm of freedom of association.  As discussed 
below, the ILO has explicitly recognized freedom of association as one of 
four fundamental human rights that protect all workers, including 
unauthorized and undocumented workers.  Other international instruments 
applicable to the United States likewise allow for exceptions to the principle 
of freedom of association only in a narrow range of circumstances that do 
not justify denying this right to aliens or unauthorized immigrants.  
1. Freedom of association to protect labor union interests is a 
fundamental human right. 
Like nondiscrimination, the right to freedom of association, including the 
right to organize a labor union, bargain collectively, and strike, is a 
fundamental human right which is protected in a wide range of international 
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human rights instruments, including many that are applicable to the United 
States, as follows:  
American Declaration 
Article XXII. Right of association: 
Every person has the right to associate with others to promote, exercise 
and protect his legitimate interests of a political, economic, religious, social, 
cultural, professional, labor union or other nature. 
American Convention 
Article 16. Freedom of Association: 
1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, 
political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes. 
2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such restrictions 
established by law as may be necessary in a democratic society, in the 
interest of national security, public safety or public order, or to protect 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. 
3. The provisions of this article do not bar the imposition of legal 
restrictions, including even deprivation of the exercise of the right of 
association, on members of the armed forces and the police.  
OAS Charter 
Article 45(c) & (g): 
The Member States, convinced that man can only achieve the full 
realization of his aspirations within a just social order, along with economic 
development and true peace, agree to dedicate every effort to the application 
of the following principles and mechanisms:…  
c) Employers and workers, both rural and urban, have the right to 
associate themselves freely for the defense and promotion of their interests, 
including the right to collective bargaining and the workers’ right to strike, 
and recognition of the juridical personality of associations and the 
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protection of their freedom and independence, all in accordance with 
applicable laws; . . .  
g) Recognition of the importance of the contribution of organizations 
such as labor unions, cooperatives, and cultural, professional, business, 
neighborhood, and community associations to the life of the society and to 
the development process;…. 
ICCPR 
Article 22: 
1.  Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests.   
2.  No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than 
those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or 
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  This 
article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on 
members of the armed forces and of the police in the exercise of this 
right.  
ILO Convention (No. 87) on the Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize161   
Article 2:  
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the 
right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation 
concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous 
authorisation.  
Article 9: 
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The extent to which the guarantees provided for in this Convention shall 
apply to the armed forces and the police shall be determined by national 
laws or regulations. 
Article 11:   
Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this 
Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate  
measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the 
right to organise. 
ILO Convention (No. 98) regarding the Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining162  
Article 1:  
1. Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination in respect of their employment. 
2. Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts 
calculated to: 
(a) make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he 
shall not join a union or shall relinquish trade union membership; 
(b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of 
union membership or because of participation in union activities 
outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within 
working hours.   
Other international instruments applicable in some form to the United 
States which recognize the right to freedom of association include the 
ICESCR (Article 8), the Universal Declaration (Articles 20.1 and 23.4), and 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Between the 
Government of the United States of America, the Government of Canada, 
and the Government of the United Mexican States (NAALC) (Articles 2, 
4).163  These specific treaty clauses regarding freedom of association are set 
forth in Appendix C, Table 1, attached to this brief.  
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As discussed below, none of these instruments authorizes denial of the 
right to freedom of association based on alienage, unauthorized worker, or 
other immigration status, as discussed below.  Because the ILO is the 
international body that has most specifically addressed this question, 
jurisprudence under the ILO conventions will be considered first, followed 
by the ICCPR and the American Convention.   
2. The right to freedom of association protected by the ILO applies 
equally to all workers, regardless of status.  
The principle of freedom of association in the labor context is set forth in 
greatest detail in ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98.  The ILO has long 
considered freedom of association to be a core human rights provision 
relating to worker rights.  The Preamble to the ILO Constitution recognizes 
freedom of association as a means of establishing peace,164 while the 
Declaration of Philadelphia reaffirms that freedom of expression and 
association are essential to sustained progress.165  Indeed, the principle is so 
important that for over fifty years, the ILO has maintained that the 
obligation to protect the right to freedom of association is binding on all 
ILO members as a matter of membership, regardless of whether states have 
ratified the relevant ILO conventions.166  Furthermore, in its 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles of Work, the ILO 
recognized freedom of association, like nondiscrimination, as one of the 
four core labor rights that constitute fundamental human rights, and which 
are binding on all ILO members, regardless of their ratification records.  
Thus, like the ILO principle of nondiscrimination, the principle of freedom 
of association is obligatory on the United States as a result of its ILO 
membership, despite its failure to ratify the two relevant ILO 
conventions.167  As the international body with the greatest expertise in the 
labor rights area, the ILO’s interpretation of the principle of freedom of 
association is also relevant to the construction of freedom of association 
under other international instruments to which the United States is a party.   
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The ILO Conventions regarding freedom of association do not allow for 
any exception based on a worker’s immigration status or employment 
authorization.  Conventions No. 87 and 98 expressly recognize exceptions 
only for members of the national police and armed forces, an exception that 
is not implicated in this case.   
Moreover, the ILO has interpreted the right to freedom of association as a 
fundamental right that cannot be denied even to migrant workers who are 
not lawfully present in a country.  In the Spain case, for example, the ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) concluded that a Spanish law 
which provided that foreigners could exercise trade union rights only “when 
they obtain authorization of their stay or residence in the country” violated 
the fundamental right to freedom of association.168  The CFA confirmed that 
Article 2 of Convention No. 87 “recognize[s] the rights of all workers, 
without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join organizations of their 
own choosing,” with the only permissible exception relating to the armed 
forces and police.169 
In an opinion issued in 2002, the ILO likewise interpreted the Migrant 
Workers Convention (No. 143)170 and Recommendation (No. 151)171 as 
providing that “illegally employed migrant workers are not deprived, by the 
sole reference to their undocumented status, of their rights in respect of the 
work actually performed.”172  In particular, the ILO reasoned that despite 
the authority of states to treat documented and undocumented migrant 
workers differently with respect to non-fundamental workplace rights, all 
migrant workers are entitled to equal treatment with respect to “basic 
human rights.”173  These rights include the fundamental human rights 
contained in U.N. instruments, as well as the four core ILO worker rights 
and their eight accompanying conventions.174  Although the Migrant 
Convention itself has not been widely ratified by ILO members, the ILO 
concluded that the decisions regarding application of the eight fundamental 
ILO conventions (including freedom of association and nondiscrimination), 
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“apply to all workers, whether nationals or non-nationals, without 
distinction.”175  
3. The Inter-American instruments and the ICCPR do not recognize 
exceptions based on a worker’s unauthorized status. 
a. The American Declaration and Convention  
The principle of freedom of association under the American Declaration 
is potentially even broader than that recognized by the ILO, since Article 
XXII of the Declaration applies to “every person” and includes no express 
exceptions.  On the other hand, the American Convention, the ICCPR, and 
the ICESCR all recognize that states may make exceptions to this right 
under certain circumstances. The American Convention applies to 
“everyone”, but recognizes exceptions for the armed forces and police as 
well as exceptions that are established by law and are “necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interest of national security, public safety or 
public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or freedoms 
of others.”176  The ICCPR (Art. 22(2)) and ICESCR (Art. 8(1)(c) and (2)) 
contain similar language.  And although these exceptions might be 
construed as allowing broad suspensions of trade union rights, international 
bodies have construed them very narrowly.   
In the Baena Ricardo case, the Inter-American Court elaborated on the 
requirement that an exception be “necessary in a democratic society.”  The 
Court interpreted the principle of freedom of association in the labor union 
context as protecting “the basic right to constitute a group for the pursuit of 
a lawful goal, without pressure or interference that may alter or denature its 
objective.”177  The Court noted that “in trade union matters, freedom of 
association is of the utmost importance for the defence of the legitimate 
interests of the workers, and falls under the corpus juris of human rights.”178 
The Court further concluded that the measures taken to deny the exercise 
of trade union rights in that case could not be justified under the Article 16 
exceptions.  In particular, the Court found that there was no evidence that 
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the measures “were necessary to safeguard the public order in the context of 
the events, nor that they maintained a relationship to the principle of 
proportionality; in sum . . . such measures did not meet the requirement of 
being ‘necessary in a democratic society,’” as required by Article 16(2) of 
the Convention. 
b. The ICCPR  
The text of Article 16 of the American Convention was based on the 
ICCPR,179 which also imposes rigorous requirements on the exceptions to 
freedom of association.  Freedom of association with respect to trade union 
rights was expressly included in the ICCPR, despite its protection in the 
ICESCR and ILO conventions, in order to underscore its importance as a 
civil, as well as economic, right.180  Like other ICCPR provisions, Article 
22 applies to “[e]veryone,” and thus applies equally to aliens and nationals 
alike under the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on the 
Position of Aliens.181 
None of the allowable restrictions on trade union activities under Article 
22 of the ICCPR suggest that a state may deny the right to freedom of 
association based on alienage or other immigration status.  Like the 
American Convention, restrictions on freedom of association under Article 
22 must be “prescribed by law” (e.g., set down in sufficient definiteness by 
legislative act or the common law), and must be “necessary to a democratic 
society” for achieving one of the purposes set down in Article 22(2).  
According to the CCPR Commentary, necessity under the ICCPR imposes a 
strict requirement of proportionality; in other words, both the type and 
intensity of a restriction must be absolutely necessary to attain a legitimate 
purpose.182  The requirement that restrictions must comport with democratic 
principles further requires that restrictions serve basic democratic values of 
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.183 
Finally, any restriction must be “in the interests of national security or 
public safety, public order (ordre public) the protection of public health or 
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morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others,” and must also 
be proportional – or precisely balanced to the reason for the measure.184  
More sweeping restrictions may be imposed only on members of the police 
and armed forces.185 
According to Human Rights Committee jurisprudence and the CCPR 
Commentary, the exception for national security refers narrowly to grave 
cases of political or military threat to the entire nation, where action is 
necessary to secure the smooth functioning of the military and other 
forces,186 while public safety contemplates a specific threat to the safety of 
persons or things.187  Public order (or the French concept of “ordre public”), 
refers to those “universally accepted fundamental principles, consistent with 
respect for human rights, on which a democratic society is based.188  This 
exception allows states to impose time, place, and manner restrictions on 
trade union activities, including registration requirements and restrictions on 
general strikes that cripple the economic or public life of the state.189  
Finally, protection of the rights and freedoms of others refers to protection 
of fundamental individual rights, as well as issues of personal safety and 
physical integrity.  It allows restrictions on freedom of association to protect 
private property rights and to prohibit advocacy of national, racial, or 
religious hatred.190  
c. The denial of meaningful remedies to unauthorized workers cannot be 
justified under the exceptions recognized by international law.  
There can be little question that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hoffman that unauthorized workers may not recover back pay 
when they are improperly fired for union-related activities substantially 
eviscerates the right of freedom of association for unauthorized workers in 
the United States. Because unauthorized workers are not entitled to 
reinstatement when they are wrongfully terminated, back pay for lost wages 
is the only effective remedy available for violations of the NLRA for this 
group.  Eliminating this remedy thus grants a carte blanche to employers to 
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violate unauthorized migrant workers’ basic human rights with impunity, 
and eliminates any meaningful recourse for such workers.  The Hoffman 
decision thus contravenes the United States’ obligation under international 
law to provide “adequate protection” against anti-union discrimination,191 
and de facto eliminates the right to organize and bargain collectively for 
unauthorized migrant workers, regardless of whether they are lawfully 
present in the United States.192 
Nor can the restriction on remedies for violations of freedom of 
association be justified under any exception in international law due to the 
migrants’ status as unauthorized workers.  The ILO conventions recognize 
no such exception, and even under the exceptions allowed by the American 
Convention, ICCPR, and ICESCR, the U.S. rules limiting the freedom of 
association rights of unauthorized workers cannot be sustained. National 
security, public safety, health or morals, or the rights of others are all 
narrow exceptions which are not implicated by the Hoffman rule.  Only the 
public order exception could arguably be invoked to justify denial of 
effective remedies to unauthorized workers in order to deter unauthorized 
immigration.  Even that exception, however, does not comfortably 
accommodate an immigration justification.  Moreover, an immigration 
control justification clearly would not satisfy international law’s 
requirements that the remedy be proportional and necessary to a democratic 
society recognized both by this Court and the ICCPR.  Denial of freedom of 
association benefits to immigrant workers is contrary to the principles of 
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.   
As discussed with respect to nondiscrimination, above, denial of effective 
remedies for trade union violations is in no sense necessary or proportional 
to the goal of immigration control.  There is no indication that respecting 
the fundamental right to freedom of association for such workers will in any 
way thwart the effectiveness of U.S. immigration policy.  Indeed, far from 
deterring unlawful immigration, denial of freedom of association rights to 
immigrants has precisely the opposite effect, creating an incentive for 
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unscrupulous employers to recruit unauthorized workers, whom the 
employer knows effectively cannot organize or otherwise seek the 
protection of U.S. laws.  The denial of the back pay remedy simply harms 
unauthorized workers, other workers who seek to assert their collective 
bargaining rights in the workplace, and scrupulous employers who are 
disadvantaged by the economic advantage gained by employers who are 
willing to exploit the reduced rights of unauthorized immigrants.  
CONCLUSION 
As noted in the introduction to this brief, the United States is the largest 
employer of migrant workers in the world.  U.S. laws that discriminate 
against migrant workers in employment affect a tremendous number of 
OAS nationals, and subject them to significant forms of mistreatment and 
discrimination.  Non-nationals in certain immigration categories and certain 
geographical locations are expressly excluded from the protections of vital 
labor and employment laws, including workers’ compensation protections, 
the right of legal assistance to redress employment law violations, the 
protections of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
and the Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices Act.  Moreover, 
unauthorized immigrant workers’ rights to certain remedies for violation of 
their fundamental right to organize and to be free from discrimination are 
hampered by the Hoffman decision. Unscrupulous employers use these 
pronouncements by courts to take unfair advantage of immigrant workers.   
U.S. laws and court decisions depriving migrant workers of labor rights 
and other employee protections violate international nondiscrimination and 
freedom of association norms.  International human rights law does not 
generally allow distinctions on the basis of alienage, or distinctions based 
on immigration status where fundamental rights such as nondiscrimination 
and freedom of association are implicated.  Nor can these laws be justified 
by the government’s border-control prerogative, because migration control 
is demonstrably not served by limiting worker protections for immigrants, 
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and because the general protective purpose of employment laws is not 
served by distinctions drawn on the basis of nationality or immigrant 
classification.  
The effect of exclusionary laws and court decisions is to both undermine 
workers’ rights and enforcement of immigration law.  Employers are 
encouraged to take unfair advantage of unauthorized workers, all to the 
detriment of the workers themselves and to the employers who abide by 
U.S. employment laws.  The sheer number of OAS natio193nals who are 
implicated, the vulnerability of these workers, and the paucity of decisions 
regarding the employment rights of non-nationals in the OAS or elsewhere 
in the international system underscores the need for this Court to lend 
clarity to the provisions of the Inter-American system and to establish 
fundamental worker protections for all workers in the region. 
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OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF 
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, available at 
http//:193.194.138.190/pdf/ report.pdf.  The United States’ signature nevertheless 
obligates the United States not to violate the object and purpose of the treaty, as discussed 
supra note 98. 
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101 Although the ICESCR nondiscrimination clause is limited to “the rights enunciated in 
the present Covenant,” the employment rights discussed in this brief are protected by the 
ICESCR.  Thus, ICESCR Article 2(2) is fully relevant to this general discussion of 
nondiscrimination. 
102 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (AIII), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). As an early statement of human rights that was 
unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, the Declaration is evidence of early 
and ongoing support for the international norms examined herein.  Moreover, the 
principles of the UDHR are widely considered to have reached the status of customary 
international law. See Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary 
International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1995/1996). 
103 ILO Convention C111 Concerning Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 
June 15, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960) available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm. 
104 These four fundamental rights are supported by eight ILO conventions.  See INT’L 
LABOUR ORG., Fundamental ILO Conventions, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/ 
english/standards/ norm/whatare/fundam/index.htm.  For purposes of this discussion, the 
relevant conventions are those relating to nondiscrimination in employment; see, e.g., 
ILO Convention C111 supra note 103, and those relating to freedom of association, e.g., 
ILO Convention C87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise , July 9, 1948 (entered into force July 4, 1950), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm; ILO Convention C98 Concerning Right 
to Organise and Collective Bargaining , July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (entered into force 
July 18, 1951). 
105 Although the United States has not ratified the ILO’s fundamental conventions 
relating to nondiscrimination and freedom of association, under the ILO’s 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, all ILO member states, 
including the United States, are obligated to respect these core principles, regardless 
whether they have ratified the relevant ILO conventions.  See ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, art. 2, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233 (1998) 
(declaring that “all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, 
have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to 
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, 
the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those 
Conventions”). 
106 The European Convention on Human Rights includes a general clause authorizing the 
denial of all political rights to non-nationals.  See European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 16.  
Article 1(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also excludes 
from the Convention’s scope distinctions “between citizens and non-citizens.”  
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).  Other than the narrow 
distinctions for aliens set forth in Articles 13 and 25 of the ICCPR, discussed herein, 
none of the instruments addressed in this brief similarly provide for distinctions based on 
alienage. 
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107 E.g., ICCPR, supra note 99, art. 12(1) (“everyone lawfully within the territory of a 
State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to 
choose his residence”).  See also David Weissbrodt, Progress Report On The Rights Of 
Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 2002/25 (2002), ¶ 38 [hereinafter Weissbrodt]. 
108 MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY (1993) [hereinafter CCPR COMMENTARY]. 
109 Id. § 12-3, at 199. 
110 ICCPR, supra note 99, art. 4(1) (“In time of public emergency which threatens the life 
of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the 
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present 
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law 
and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin.”).  Unlike the ICCPR’s Article 2(1) and Article 26 
nondiscrimination clauses, the Article 4 derogation clause does not include “national 
origin” among the impermissible grounds for discrimination.  According to the travaux 
prèparatoires, this omission reflects the drafters’ recognition that States often find it 
necessary to discriminate against non-citizens in time of national emergency. See 
Weissbrodt, supra note 107, ¶ 20; CCPR COMMENTARY, supra note 108, § 4-28, at 86. 
111 CCPR COMMENTARY, supra note 108, § 2-31, at 43.  Early drafts of Article 2 by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the drafting committee expressly provided that 
the rights of the Covenant applied equally to citizens, nationals, aliens and stateless 
persons, though a broader application was ultimately adopted.  Id. § 2-43, at 51, n. 119.  
Moreover, the ICCPR’s protection under Article 2 was expressly extended to all 
“individuals” within a state’s territory rather than to all “persons,” to prevent states from 
excluding some persons from the treaty’s protections by denying them legal personality.  
Id. § 2-23, at 39-40. 
112 Id. § 2-43, at 51. 
113 Austria, whose domestic bill of rights only protects equality for nationals, entered a 
reservation that Article 26 would not preclude differential treatment of Austrian nationals 
and aliens. CCPR/X/2/Rev.3, reprinted in CCPR COMMENTARY, supra note 108, 
Appendix, at 751.  Trinidad and Tobago likewise reserved the right to restrict property 
acquisition by aliens. Id. at 768. 
114 The Human Rights Committee is the treaty body established by Article 40 of the 
ICCPR to monitor and interpret state compliance with that treaty.  States Parties are 
required to submit to the Human Rights Committee periodic reports on their progress in 
implementing ICCPR rights. 
115 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE 
POSITION OF ALIENS UNDER THE COVENANT, 11/04/86, CCPR GENERAL COMMENT 15, ¶ 
¶ 1, 2, available at  http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom15.htm [hereinafter 
“GENERAL COMMENT”].  The Human Rights Committee is authorized to issue “such 
general comments as it may consider appropriate.” ICCPR, art. 40(4).  The Committee’s 
general comments are addressed to all States parties and are intended, among other 
things, “to draw the attention of the States parties to matters relating to the improvement 
of . . . the implementation of the Covenant” and to “stimulate activities of States parties . . 
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. in the promotion and protection of human rights.”  Statement on the duties of the Human 
Rights Committee under article 40 of the Covenant, Decision of the Committee of 30 
October 1980, CCPR/C/18, A/36/40, reproduced in CCPR COMMENTARY, supra note 
108, at appendix, 845.  Such comments, therefore, are an important interpretive guide to 
the ICCPR. 
116 GENERAL COMMENT, supra note 115, ¶ 2. 
117 Id. ¶ 7. 
118 Id. ¶ 6. 
119 Id. ¶ 5. 
120 ICCPR, supra note 99, at art. 12(3) (requiring any restrictions on Article 12 rights to 
be, among other things, “necessary to protect national security, public order [order 
public], public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.”) 
121 GENERAL COMMENT, supra note 115, ¶ 12. 
122 Id., ¶ 9 (“the particular rights of article 13 only protect those aliens who are lawfully in 
the territory of a State party.  This means that national law concerning the requirements 
for entry and stay must be taken into account in determining the scope of that protection, 
and that illegal entrants and aliens who have stayed longer than the law or their permits 
allow, in particular, are not covered by its provisions.”). 
123 Id. ¶ 10. 
124 See, e.g., Decision of the Human Rights Committee under art. 5(4) of the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Thirty-Fifth Session, 
concerning Communication No. 196/1985; CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985 (April 6, 1989) 
[hereinafter Gueye v. France].  See also S.W.M. Broeks v. Netherlands, H.R. Comm. No. 
172/1984 U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (Apr. 9, 1987); F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, 
H.R. Comm. No. 182/1984 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (Apr. 9, 1987); GENERAL 
COMMENT, supra note 115, § 12 (“the application of the principle of non-discrimination 
contained in article 26 is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the 
Covenant”). 
125 CCPR COMMENTARY, supra note 108, § 2-33, 44. 
126 Id. § 26-25, 474. 
127 Zwaan-de Vries, supra note 124, §§ 12–15. 
128 Gueye v. France, supra note 124. 
129 Initially, the French pension program had awarded equal benefits to all veterans 
regardless of nationality, but a subsequent law reduced benefits for non-French citizens. 
Id. ¶ 8.2. 
130 Id. ¶ 9.4. 
131 France contended that the policy was justified because (1) the Senegalese officers 
were no longer French nationals; (2) it was too difficult for France to establish the 
identity and family situation of former soldiers in African countries; and (3) the cost of 
living in France was significantly higher than in the former colonies. Id. ¶ 1.5. France 
further argued that Senegalese soldiers who wished to receive full pensions could restore 
their French nationality.  Id. ¶ 7.1. 
132 Id. ¶ 9.5 (emphasis added).  The Committee further found that “mere administrative 
inconveniences” in administering the pension scheme could not justify unequal treatment, 
and that the justification based on living standards was pretextual, since a French national 
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living in Senegal would have received a larger pension than a Senegalese national who 
also resided there.  Id. ¶ 9.5. 
133 Id. 
134 American Convention, supra note 98, at art. 29(a). 
135 Id. at art. 30. According to the Inter-American Court’s interpretation of Article 30, a 
law enacted in the “general interest” must be “an integral element of public order.”  
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ADVISORY OPINION OC-1/82, THE WORD 
“LAWS” IN ARTICLE 30 OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ¶ 29 (Sept. 
24, 1982).  In Advisory Opinion No. 5, the Court held that the terms “general welfare” 
and “public order…must be subjected to an interpretation that is strictly limited to the 
‘just demands’ of ‘a democratic society’ which takes account of the need to balance the 
competing interests involved and the need to preserve the object and purpose of the 
Convention.” INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ADVISORY OPINION OC-
5/85, COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP IN AN ASSOCIATION PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR THE 
PRACTICE OF JOURNALISM (ARTS. 13 AND 29 OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS), ¶ 67  (Nov. 13, 1985).  The purpose of public order, in turn, is “the 
protection of the essential rights of man and the creation of circumstances that will permit 
him to achieve spiritual an material progress and attain happiness.”  ADVISORY OPINION 
OC-1/82, supra ¶ 29 (quoting the American Declaration, first introductory clause).  
Davidson has concluded from this language that a legitimate purpose is designed in “the 
interests of national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public health or 
morals or the rights or freedoms of others,” in effect reading into the Court’s opinion the 
requirements imposed by ICCPR Art. 22, discussed infra.  See J. SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE 
INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 50 (1997). 
136 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ADVISORY OPINION OC-4/84, 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NATURALIZATION PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF COSTA RICA, ¶ 32 (Jan. 19, 1984). 
137 Id. ¶ 55. 
138 Id. ¶ 57. 
139 Id. ¶ 60. 
140 INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT NO. 51/01, CASE 9903, 
(Apr. 4, 2001). 
141 Id. ¶ 68 (emphasis added). 
142 Id. ¶ 69 (emphasis added). 
143 INTER-AMERICAN CHARTER OF SOCIAL GUARANTEES, THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES, SECOND SUPPLEMENT, 1942–1954, 254 (1958). 
144 Id., at 255. 
145 ICESCR, supra note 100, at art. 2(3) (“Developing countries, with due regard to 
human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would 
guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals”).  
See Weissbrodt, supra note 107, ¶¶ 22-24. 
146 UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.15, ¶ 16 (1997) (Libya). 
147 UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.25, ¶ 13 (1998) (Netherlands); OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: SWEDEN, ¶¶ 18, E/C.12/1/Add.70 
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(2001); OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONCLUDING 
OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
(HONG KONG): CHINA, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.58, ¶ 15(f) (2001). 
148 UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.2, ¶ 10 (1996) (Spain). 
149 OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONCLUDING 
OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: 
SENEGAL, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62, ¶ 44 (24 September 2001). 
150 UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.23, ¶ 11 (1998) (Nigeria). 
151 UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.53, ¶ 19 (2000) (Portugal). 
152 UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.52, ¶ 28 (2000) (Finland). 
153 OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HONG KONG, supra note 
147 
154 UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.34, ¶ 10 (1999) (Denmark) (praising State Party’s integration 
support); UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.25, ¶ 23 (1998) (Netherlands) (urging reduction of 
discrimination to improve integration). 
155 See, e.g.,: CEACR, Individual Direct request concerning Convention No. 111, Poland, 
1992; CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 111, Denmark, 1991; 
CEACR, Individual Direct Request concerning Convention No. 111, Antigua and 
Barbuda, 2000; CEACR, Individual Direct Request concerning Convention No. 111, 
Germany, 2000. 
156 CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 111, Spain, 2000; see 
also CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 97, Spain, 2000. 
157 Int’l Labour Office Governing Body, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) 
Convention, 2975 (No. 143) (Article 9, paragraph 1 and Part I (Migration in abusive 
conditions)), GB.285/18/1 (Report of the Director-General: First Suplementary Report: 
Opinions relative to the decisions of the International Labour Conference) (November 
2002), ¶ 12, attached as Appendix D [hereinafter ILO Opinion on the Rights of Migrant 
Workers]. 
158 G.A. Res. 40/144, U.N. GAOR, 40th Session, U.N. Doc. A/40/114 (1985). Article 1 
defines the term “alien” as “any individual who is not a national of the State in which he 
or she is present” (emphasis added).  Article 5, ¶ 1 grants “aliens” specific rights, without 
specifying any particular subgroup of aliens.  Articles 9 and 10 refer to “no alien” and 
“any alien,” respectively. 
159 See David Weissbrodt, Preliminary Study on the Rights of Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/20 (2001), ¶¶ 102-106. 
160 Weissbrodt, supra note 107, ¶¶ 50-51. 
161 ILO Convention C87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organize, supra note 104.  The United States has not ratified C87, but it is binding on 
the United States as an obligation of membership in the ILO, as discussed below. 
162 ILO Convention C98 Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to 
Organize and to Bargain Collectively, supra note 104. The United States has not ratified 
C98, but it is binding on the United States as an obligation of membership in the ILO, as 
discussed below. 
163   Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 
Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 Int’l Legal Materials 1499 (1993). 
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164 INT’L LABOUR ORG. CONSTITUTION, pmbl., available at  http://www.ilo.org/public/ 
english/about/iloconst.htm#pre. 
165 INT’L LABOUR ORG., DECLARATION CONCERNING THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, May 10, 1944, I(b), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm#annex. 
166 The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association reviews state practice regarding the 
freedom of association obligations that arise from the ILO Constitution as obligations of 
membership.  See discussion in Francis Maupain, The Settlement of Disputes Within the 
International Labour Office, JIEL 273, 177 (1999). 
167 See INT’L LABOUR ORG. supra note 104. 
168 COMMITTEE OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, REPORT NO. 327 (Vol. LXXXV, 2002, 
Series B, No. 1), Spain, ¶ 561 (Case No. 2121 of 23 March 2001). 
169 Id. 
170 ILO Convention C143 Concerning Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) 
Convention, June 24, 1975, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm. 
The ILO noted that the ILO Constitution confers no special competence on the ILO to 
interpret conventions, although the organization may provide guidance to governments 
regarding the appropriate scope of convention provisions.  Id. ¶ 2. 
171 ILO Recommendation R151 Concerning Migrant Workers Recommendation, June 24, 
1975, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/recdisp2.htm. 
172 ILO Opinion on the Rights of Migrant Workers, supra note 157 ¶ 6, attached as 
Appendix D. Recommendation 151 regarding the rights of Migrant Workers provides that 
irregular migrant workers are entitled to equality of treatment “in respect of rights arising 
out of present and past employment as regards trade union membership and exercise of 
trade union rights.”  ILO Recommendation R151, supra note 171, ¶ 8(2).  The 
Recommendation further recognizes the entitlement of irregular workers to remuneration 
for work performed, severance payments ordinarily due, and employment injury benefits.  
Id. ¶ 34. 
173 ILO Opinion on the Rights of Migrant Workers, supra note 157, ¶ 8, quoting Migrant 
Workers Convention (No. 143), art. 1. 
174 Id. ¶ 11.  See generally INT’L LABOUR ORG.: “MIGRANT WORKERS”, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, REPORT III (PART IB), INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 
87TH SESSION, GENEVA 1999; INT’L LABOUR ORG.: “MIGRANT WORKERS”, REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, REPORT III (PART 4B), INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 
66TH SESSION, GENEVA, 1980. 
175 ILO Opinion on the Rights of Migrant Workers, supra note 157, ¶ 12. 
176 American Convention, supra note 98, at art 16(3). 
177 Baena Ricardo, et al. (270 Workers v. Panama), Inter-Am. C.H.R., (Feb. 2, 2001), ¶ 
156, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/index_serie_c_ing.html (visited 
Dec. 16, 2002). 
178 Id. ¶ 158. 
179 CCPR COMMENTARY, supra note 108 ¶ 29, 397. 
180 Id., § 22-11, 389. 
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181 Id. § 22-19, 393-94.  Indeed, several European states entered reservations under the 
article allowing them to restrict the political associational activities of aliens, consistent 
with Article 16 of the European Convention. 
182 Id. § 21-20, 379. 
183 Id. § 22-21, 394; § 21-21, 379; see also Handyside Case, Euro. Ct. H.R. (1976), Series 
A No. 24, ¶ 49. 
184 CCPR COMMENTARY, supra note 108, § 22-21, 394. 
185 ICCPR, supra note 99, at art. 22(2); CCPR COMMENTARY, supra note 108, §22-30-
33, 397-98. 
186 Id. §12-34, 212. 
187 Id. § 21-23, 380. 
188 Id. §§ 21-24, 25, p. 381. 
189 Id. ¶ 23, 395. 
190 Id. § 22-26-27, 396; id. at § 21-28-29, 382-83.  The restriction for public health or 
morals is not applicable here. 
191 ILO Convention C98 , supra note 104, at art. 1(1). 
192 For further discussion of the implications of the Hoffman decision on the freedom of 
association rights of migrant workers, see Complaint presented by the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations to the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association against the Government of the United States of America for 
violation of fundamental rights of freedom of association and protection of the right to 
organize and bargain collectively concerning migrant workers in the United States, 
attached as Appendix D. 
 
